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Abstract
Bell appealed to the theory of relativity in formulating his principle of local
causality. But he maintained that quantum eld theories do not conform to
that principle, even when their eld equations are relativistically covariant and
their observable algebras satisfy a relativistically motivated microcausality con-
dition. A pragmatist view of quantum theory and an interventionist approach
to causation prompt the reevaluation of local causality and microcausality. Lo-
cal causality cannot be understood as a reasonable requirement on relativistic
quantum eld theories: it is unmotivated even if applicable to them. But mi-
crocausality emerges as a su¢ cient condition for the consistent application of a
relativistic quantum eld theory.
1 Introduction
The analysis of causal concepts and principles in relativistic quantum theories
is often now pursued in the framework of algebraic quantum eld theory. While
this has permitted an increase in mathematical rigor, that alone has not pro-
duced a resolution of di¢ culties highlighted by Bell in his seminal examination
of causality in what he called ordinary quantum mechanics. Bell appealed to
the theory of relativity in formulating his principle of local causality. But he
maintained that, even when their eld equations are relativistically covariant
and their observable algebras satisfy a relativistically motivated microcausality
condition, quantum eld theories do not conform to that principle. A pragmatist
view of quantum theory and an interventionist approach to causation prompt
the reevaluation of local causality and microcausality. I shall use these to argue
that local causality cannot be understood as a reasonable requirement on rela-
tivistic quantum eld theories. Microcausality, on the other hand, emerges as a
su¢ cient condition for the consistent application of a relativistic quantum eld
theory.
The structure of the paper is as follows. I begin by reviewing Bells argument
that ordinary quantum mechanics is not locally causal and cannot be embedded
in a locally causal theory. While recent work has helped to clarify the structure
of this argument, it is still necessary to highlight its reliance on assumptions
about the kind of theory to which it applies. In section 3 I sketch a pragmatist
view of quantum theory I have advocated elsewhere and explain why it is not
straightforward to apply Bells condition of local causality to quantum theory, so
viewed. The local causality condition is either inapplicable to quantum theory
or unmotivated by the intuitive principle on which Bell based it.
Section 4 applies an interventionist approach to causation suggested by Bells
own remarks to argue that violation of Bell inequalities in an EPR-Bell scenario
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is no sign of superluminal causation. Counterfactual relations between space-
like separated events supported by quantum correlations are not causal because
they are not stable under hypothetical interventions.
After reluctantly abandoning local causality, Bell went on to treat with skep-
ticism the suggestion that a no-superluminal-signalling requirement could serve
to express the fundamental causal structure of theoretical physics, as imple-
mented by a principle of microcausality. In section 5 I argue that a strong form
of microcausality can be justied as a su¢ cient condition for the consistent as-
signment of states in ordinary relativistic quantum mechanics. While it does
play a role in an argument against superluminal causation, a no-superluminal-
signalling requirement does not express the fundamental causal structure of
theoretical physics. This should disappoint no one. A precise formulation of
physical theory will not use causal notions. Rather than inhering in the struc-
ture of theoretical models, causal structure emerges only when one adopts the
perspective of a physically situated agent thinking of applying these models.
Section 6 briey extends this analysis of local causality and microcausality
to relativistic algebraic quantum eld theory. While this does not substantially
a¤ect its conclusions, a standard formulation of microcausality in this context
is already strong enough to guarantee a consistent, relativistically invariant
assignment of states.
2 Local Causality
In La Nouvelle Cuisine, the last of an important series of papers (reprinted in
his [2004]), J.S. Bell argued that any seriously formulated theory meeting a local
causality condition based on an intuitive conception of local action tailored to
the structure of relativistic space-time predicts correlations di¤erent from those
successfully predicted by quantum theory. Applying this condition to ordinary
quantum mechanicshe concluded that quantum theory is neither locally causal
nor embeddable in a locally causal theory. He had already made clear in an ear-
lier paper ([2004], p.55) that he took ordinary quantum mechanics to include
relativistic quantum eld theory. If this conclusion follows, then not only does
relativistic quantum eld theory conict with the intuitive conception of rela-
tivistic local action, but so would any seriously formulated theory compatible
with some of its experimentally veried predictions.
The dialectic of the previous paragraph has produced something of a con-
sensus among those most closely inuenced by Bells writings that the observed
correlations demonstrate the falsity of the intuitive principle in that sense the
world itself is non-local. So it is important to see whether Bells conclusion does
indeed follow, and to be clear on whether quantum theory satises the condition
of local causality or can be squared with the intuitive conception on which Bell
based it.
Bell ([2004], p.239) begins his argument by stating the following intuitive
principle of local causality:
The direct causes (and e¤ects) of events are near by, and even the
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indirect causes (and e¤ects) are no further away than permitted by
the velocity of light.
Appropriately, he takes this to be too imprecise to serve as a premise in a
mathematical argument, involving as it does the vague notions of cause and
e¤ect. Such words as causeand e¤ectwill not appear in the formulation of
any serious theory. But as he points out elsewhere this does not mean that one
cannot investigate the causal structure of a theory:
I would insist here on the distinction between analyzing various phys-
ical theories on the one hand, and philosophising about the unique
real world on the other. In this matter of causality it is a great
inconvenience that the world is given to us once only. We cannot
know what would have happened if something had been di¤erent.
. . . Physical theories are more amenable in this respect. We can
calculate the consequences of changing free elements in a theory, be
they only initial conditions, and so explore the causal structure of
the theory. ([2004], p.101)
Indeed, Bell ([2004], p.239) continues by formulating a local causality con-
dition on physical theories of a certain kind based on his intuitive principle.
In doing so he uses the important neologism beable, which he had previously
introduced as follows:
It is not easy to identify precisely which physical processes are to be
given the status of observationsand which are to be relegated to
the limbo between one observation and another. So it could be hoped
that some increase in precision might be possible by concentration
on the beables, which can be described in classical terms, because
they are there. The beables must include the settings of switches
and knobs on experimental equipment, the currents in coils, and the
readings of instruments. Observables must be made, somehow,
out of beables. (Bell [2004], p.52)
After this introduction, he had gone on to distinguish a class of local beables:
We will be particularly concerned with local beables, those which
(unlike the total energy) can be assigned to some bounded space-
time region. ...
It is in terms of local beables that we can hope to formulate some
notion of local causality. (Bell [2004], p.53)
Section 3 of La Nouvelle Cuisinegives his reasons to hope.
No one is obliged to consider the question What cannot go faster
than light?. But if you do decide to do so, then the above remarks
suggest the following: you must identify in your theory local be-
ables. The beables of the theory are those entities in it that are,
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at least tentatively, to be taken seriously, as corresponding to some-
thing real. ([2004], p.234)
In the above remarksBell had distinguished elements of a classical the-
ory (such as the electric and magnetic elds of Maxwells electromagnetism)
intended to represent something real from elements (such as the electric and
magnetic potentials) that function only as calculational tools, not to corre-
spond to something real. Note that while Bell introduces beables as entities,
his examples can all be recast as (values of) physical magnitudes, respecting the
parallel between beables and observables.
He continues
Now it may well be that there just are no local beables in the most
serious theories. When space-time itself is quantized, as is gen-
erally held to be necessary, the concept of locality becomes very
obscure. ... So all our considerations are restricted to that level
of approximation to serious theories in which space-time can be re-
garded as given, and localization becomes meaningful. Even then,
we are frustrated by the vagueness of contemporary quantum me-
chanics. You will hunt in vain in the text-books for the local beables
of the theory. What you may nd there are the so-called local ob-
servables. It is then implicit that the apparatus of observation,
or better, of experimentation, and the experimental results, are real
and localized. We will have to do as best we can with these rather
ill-dened local beables, while hoping always for a more serious refor-
mulation of quantum mechanics where the local beables are explicit
and mathematical rather than implicit and vague. ([2004], p.235)
It will be important in what follows to distinguish between beables (local
or otherwise) that gure in a serious formulation of a theory such as quantum
theory and beables acknowledged in applications of that theory. The metric,
Riemann and stress-energy tensors will gure in any serious formulation of gen-
eral relativity: applications of general relativity to actual physical systems will
go on to specify additional beables, including particular elds or particles that
contribute to the stress-energy tensor, not to mention the orientation and mag-
nication of telescopes involved in experimental tests of the theory. The set
of local beables acknowledged in this way by a theory includes but is almost
always much larger than the class of beables involved in formulating it. The
settings of switches and knobs on experimental equipment, the currents in coils,
and the readings of instruments may be involved in experimental applications
of quantum theory, but only an extreme operationalist would argue that these
local beables are required for its formulation.
I shall call any beables guring in a formulation of a theory fundamental, and
any additional beables involved in applications of that theory non-fundamental.
It follows that, unless they also gure in a formulation of quantum theory, the
apparatus of observation, or better, of experimentation, and the experimental
results, are at best non-fundamental beables. Quantum theory acknowledges
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these beables in some (though not all) applications, but its formulation need
not (and, I maintain, should not) involve them. For the moment this leaves the
question of the fundamental beables of quantum theory, if any, open.
Based on his intuitive principle of local causality, Bell formulates the follow-
ing condition on theories:
Local Causality
A theory is said to be locally causal if the probabilities attached
to values of local beables in a space-time region 1 are unaltered
by specication of values of local beables in a space-like separated
region 2, when what happens in the backward light cone of 1 is
already su¢ ciently specied, for example by a full specication of
all local beables in a space-time region 3. ([2004], pp.239-40)
The regions 1-3 are as indicated in gure 1. Several points here require
comment and clarication.
Any application of Bells Local Causality condition requires a prior speci-
cation of the relevant classes of local beables. But note that these need not be
the fundamental beables of the theory to which it is to be applied: at least some
may be non-fundamental beables, acknowledged by the theory in applications
but not mentioned in formulating it. Indeed, in the intended application of this
condition the local beables in regions 1 and 2 may be taken to be the readings
and settings of instruments such as photon (atom, or other system) detectors.
It may turn out to be possible to apply this Local Causality condition to a the-
ory without identifying local beables in that theory the theorys fundamental
beables.
Even given a specication of local beables in regions 1 and 2, Bells Local
Causality condition is applicable only to theories that attach a well-dened
probability to each measurable set of values of one or more local beables in
region 1. This raises a number of issues.
The condition is not applicable to a theory that permits local beables in
region 1 to assume certain values while disallowing others, without assigning
any probabilities. But no such theory is of interest in the intended applications,
since here it would be too weak to predict statistics successfully predicted by
quantum theory.
A more important issue concerns the moment at which a theory is presumed
to attach probabilities to values of local beables in region 1. In a relativistic
space-time, the natural notion of a moment of time is a space-like Cauchy sur-
face: such a moment may be said to be before (events in) region 1 just in case it
bisects the backward light-cone of 1 (though not 1 itself), but after (events in)
region 1 just in case it bisects the forward light-cone of 1 (though not 1 itself).
Only a deterministic theory can be expected to attach the same probability (viz.
0 or 1) to some value of a local beable in region 1 at every moment: a proba-
bilistic theory may be expected to attach the same probability (either 0 or 1)
at every moment after region 1, but typically some intermediate probability at
moments before region 1. Such a theory may well attach di¤erent probabilities
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to a value of a local beable in region 1 at di¤erent moments before region 1.
A precise statement of Bells Local Causality condition requires a specication
of when (at what moment before region 1) the theory attaches probabilities to
values of local beables in space-time region 1.
Two space-like Cauchy surfaces t,tbefore region 1 may coincide everywhere
within the backward light cone of region 1 (on a closed hypersurface ), where t
but not tis before region 2 indeed tmay be after 2, including a hypersurface
 closed by the forward light cone of 2 (see gure 2). Bell clearly intended his
condition of Local Causality as a natural generalization of a condition of local
determinism modeled on a theory like Maxwellian electromagnetism (cf. Bell
([2004], pp.53-4). What made the determinism of Maxwellian electromagnetism
local was that, according to that theory, the electric and magnetic elds in a
region like 1 are wholly determined by their values at places within the backward
light cone of 1 at a moment before 1. So when Bell formulated his condition of
Local Causality he may have taken it for granted that the theories to which it
was to apply would attach the same probabilities to values of local beables in
space-time region 1 at any pair of moments like t,tthat share a common part
such as  within the backward light cone of region 1.
Local Causality makes a deeper implicit assumption about how a theory
attaches probabilities to values of local beables in a space-time region 1 the
assumption that when a theory attaches a probability at a moment to each
measurable set of values of a local beable that probability is unique. Only with
this assumption can one speak of altering probabilities attached to values of lo-
cal beables rather than attaching additional probabilities to them. To see that
this assumption does not go without saying, consider a probabilistic theory like
classical statistical mechanics. When applying the theory to an isolated macro-
scopic system one may consistently attach two di¤erent probabilities at t1to a
measurable subset of values of some macroscopic local beables at a later time
t2. Since its complete microscopic state is assumed to evolve deterministically,
either probability 0 or probability 1 may be attached to that subset: but not
knowing the complete microscopic state at t1one does not know which. The
theory may also attach a probability at t1other than 0 or 1 to this same set of
values at t2. This is the operative probability based on the accessible informa-
tion as encapsulated in a macroscopic description of the system at t1. In such
a situation the theory consistently attaches more than one probability at the
same moment to a measurable set of values of a local beable at a later time.
These are instances of the general phenomenon that probability assignments
to an event are relative to a reference class, so the same event may receive mul-
tiple probability assignments, each relative to a di¤erent reference class. Even
if a theory species a ner reference class for attaching a probability at some
moment it may imply that information about this reference class is inaccessible
at that moment and that the accessible information denes a reference class for
a di¤erent, and indeed more practically relevant, probability. Quantum theory
is such a theory, or so I shall argue in the next section.
Bells condition of Local Causality has been carefully analyzed by Norsen
[2011], whose analysis has been further improved by Seevinck and U¢ nk [2011].
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They have focused in their analyses on what exactly is involved in a su¢ cient
specication of what happens in the backward light cone of 1.
This specication could fail to be su¢ cient through failing to mention local
beables in 3 correlated with local beables in 2 through a joint correlation with
local beables in the overlap of the backward light cones of 1 and 2. A violation
of a local causality condition that did not require such a su¢ cient specication
would pose no threat to the intuitive principle of local causality: beables in
the overlap of the backward light cones could be considered the common cause
of correlated beables in 1,2. On the other hand, requiring a specication of
all local beables in 3, may render the Local Causality condition inapplicable in
attempting to show how theories meeting it predict correlations di¤erent from
those successfully predicted by quantum theory.
To see the problem, consider the set-up for the intended application depicted
in gure 3. A,B are macroscopic events1 , each usually referred to as the de-
tection of a photon linearly polarized either along or at right-angles to an a-
or b-axis respectively: a,b are events at which each axis is selected. The region
previously labeled 3 has been relabeled as 3a, a matching region 3b has been
added in the backward light cone of 2, and 3now labels the entire continuous
stack of space-like hypersurfaces right across the backward light cones of 1
and 2, shielding o¤ these light conesoverlap from 1,2 themselves. Note that
each of 1,a is space-like separated from each of 2,b.
In some theories, a complete specication of local beables in 3 would con-
strain (or even determine) the selection events a,b. But in the intended appli-
cation a,b must be treated as free variables in the following sense: in applying a
theory to a scenario of the relevant kind each of a,b is to be speciable indepen-
dently in a theoretical model, and both are taken to be speciable independently
of a specication of local beables in region 3. Since this may exclude some com-
plete theoretical specications of beables in region 3 it is best not to require
such completeness. Instead, one should say exactly what it is for a specication
to be su¢ cient.
Seevinck and U¢ nk [2011] clarify this notion of su¢ ciency as a combina-
tion of functional and statistical su¢ ciency, rendering the label b and random
variable B (respectively) redundant for predicting Pa;b(AjB; ), the probability
a theory species for beable A representing the outcome recorded in region 1
given beables a,b representing the free choices of what the apparatus settings
are in sub-regions of 1,2 respectively, conditional on outcome B in region 2 and
beable specication  in region 3. This implies
Pa;b(AjB; ) = Pa(Aj) (1a)
By symmetry, interchanging 1with 2, Awith Band awith bimplies
Pa;b(BjA; ) = Pb(Bj) (1b)
1To simplify notation, I use each of A,B to denote a random variable, a value of that
variable, or an event in which that variable acquires a value, trusting that the context will
make it clear which is intended.
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Seevinck and U¢ nk [2011] o¤er equations (1a) and (1b) as their mathe-
matically sharp and clean (re)formulation of the condition of local causality.
Together, these equations imply the condition
Pa;b(A;Bj) = Pa(Aj) Pb(Bj) (2)
used to derive CHSH inequalities. Experimental evidence that these inequalities
are violated by the observed correlations in just the way quantum theory leads
one to expect may then be taken to disconrm Bells intuitive causality principle.
In more detail, Seevinck and U¢ nk [2011] claim that orthodox quantum
mechanics violates the statistical su¢ ciency conditions (commonly known as
Outcome Independence, following Shimony)
Pa;b(AjB; ) = Pa;b(Aj) (3a)
Pa;b(BjA; ) = Pa;b(Bj) (3b)
while conforming to the functional su¢ ciency conditions (commonly known
as Parameter Independence, following Shimony)
Pa;b(Aj) = Pa(Aj) (4a)
Pa;b(Bj) = Pb(Bj) (4b)
Statistical su¢ ciency is a condition employed by statisticians in situations
where considerations of locality and causality simply dont arise. But in this
application the failure of quantum theory to provide a specication of beables
in region 3 such that the outcome B is always redundant for determining the
probability of outcome A (and similarly with A, B interchanged) has clear
connections to local causality, as Seevinck and U¢ nks [2011] analysis has shown.
In the light of Seevinck and U¢ nks [2011] analysis, perhaps Bells Local
Causality condition should be reformulated as follows:
Local CausalitySU A theory is said to be locally causalSU if it
acknowledges a class R of beables  in space-time region 3 whose
values may be attached independently of the choice of a,b and are
then su¢ cient to render b functionally redundant and B statistically
redundant for the task of specifying the probability of A in region 1.
The notions of statistical and functional redundancy appealed to here are as
follows:
For "R;  renders B statistically redundant for the task of
specifying the probability of A i¤ Pa;b(AjB; ) = Pa;b(Aj).
For "R,  renders b functionally redundant for the task of
specifying the probability of A i¤ Pa;b(Aj) = Pa(Aj).
Note that this reformulation still
i) assumes that a theory species a unique probability of A in region 1, but
ii) does not say at what moment A has that probability.
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The claim that quantum theory is not locally causal depends on a compar-
ison between quantum probabilities and the probabilities of equations (2)-(4).
Specically, quantum theory is alleged to violate (2) and (3) but not (4). To
evaluate this claim we need to know how to understand  for quantum theory.
The claim is most plausible if one takes  to be specied by an appropriately
entangled quantum state such as + = 1=
p
2(jHHi + jV V i). Application of
the Born rule of quantum theory to this state at a moment after 3 but before
both 1 and 2 yields values
Pa;a(A(1)j) = Pa(A(1)j) =
Pa(A(2)j) = 1=2 = Pa;a(A(1); A(2)j)
Hence Pa;a(A(1); A(2)j) 6= Pa(A(1)j) Pa(A(2)j)
so (2) fails, and Pa;a(A(1)jA(2); ) 6= Pa;a(A(1)j) so (3) fails.
(Here Pa(A(1)j) is the probability of A in 1, while Pa(A(2)j) is the prob-
ability of an event of the same type in 2, with the relevant detector set to a
in each case. The probability Pa;a(A(1)jA(2); ) has been calculated in accor-
dance with the standard denition of conditional probability Pa;b(AjB; ) =
Pa;b(A;Bj)Pa;b(Bj): this is uncontroversial in quantum theory for compat-
ible A,B.)
3 Quantum States and Born Probabilities
In a pragmatist view of quantum theory I have advocated elsewhere (Healey[2012a,b,
2013]) a quantum state functions not to represent some novel physical structure
but to o¤er authoritative advice to any agent on the signicance and credibility
of magnitude claims of the form M(s) : The value of M on s lies in , where
M is a dynamical variable, s is a physical system and  is a Borel set of real
numbers. A quantum state assignment is objectively true (or false): in that
deationary sense a quantum state is objectively real. But its function is not
to represent some new quantum beable but to help an agent applying quan-
tum theory to predict and explain what happens, as described in non-quantum
language. The truth-value of a quantum state assignment depends on physical
conditions specifable in non-quantum terms (i.e. with no mention of quan-
tum states, observables, Born probabilities or other characteristic elements of a
quantum-theoretic model). Such a specication is given by a set of signicant
magnitude claims.2
It is the specied conditions that make a quantum state assignment true,
when it is: the quantum state is backed by (supervenes on) these conditions it
is not caused by them. The quantum state is perhaps best thought of as o¤er-
ing a useful summary of its backing conditions. The epistemic function of the
2This may seem circular since it is one function of a quantum state to advise an agent
on the signicance of such claims (see Healey[2012b]). But to correctly assign a quantum
state an agent need not be able to make signicant magnitude claims specifying the physical
conditions on which it depends.
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quantum state must be clearly distinguished from its non-epistemic, physical
grounds. An agent may be warranted in assigning a quantum state even while
ignorant of exactly what physical conditions back that assignment. An assign-
ment may be justied restrospectively by appeal to the success of predictions
made on its basis. It is because it is often di¢ cult fully to articulate the specic
physical conditions backing a quantum state assignment that the application
of quantum theory requires skill extending beyond the ability to manipulate
the quantum formalism. But the absence of precise rules for applying it in no
way distinguishes quantum theory from classical physics. A precise formulation
of quantum theory may be given without using measurementor any other of
Bells proscribed words to formulate the Born rule or any physical "collapse"
postulate. It does not detract from this precision that agents applying the
theory must assign quantum states to systems without being able precisely to
specify the physical conditions backing that application.
Quantum states are relational on this interpretation. The primary function
of Born probabilities is to o¤er an agent authoritative advice on how to appor-
tion degrees of belief concerning signicant magnitude claims which the agent
is not currently in a position to check. It follows that a system does not have
a unique quantum state. For when agents (actually or merely hypothetically)
occupy relevantly di¤erent physical situations they should assign di¤erent quan-
tum states to one and the same system, even though these di¤erent quantum
states are perfectly objective. Each will consequently assign di¤erent Born prob-
abilities to a single claim M(s) about a system s in a given situation. These
di¤erent probabilities will then be equally objective and equally correct. This
feature of the interpretation will prove crucial in what follows.
Local Causality presupposes that quantum theory attaches probabilities to
values of local beables in regions 1,2. But quantum theory is not a stochastic
theory which at each moment attaches a unique probability to a future event.
The Born probabilities it supplies are for physically situated agents to adjust
their credences in magnitude claims whose truth values they are not in a position
to determine. Though objective, Born probabilities are not beables postulated
by quantum theory, intended to specify physical chances. Their function is to
guide the beliefs of users of the theory, not to represent physical reality. It is
for an agent applying the theory to attach probabilities by applying the Born
rule to a quantum state appropriate to that agents physical (and specically
spatiotemporal) location. Guidance is required only because there are physical
limits on the information that is accessible from an agents physical situation.
Now the structure of relativistic space-time imposes strict limits on accessible
information, assuming physical processes propagate only within the forward
light cone. This means that space-like as well as time-like separated agents face
di¤erent informational limitations, and so require guidance tailored to their
di¤erent physical situations.
The relational nature of quantum states and Born probabilities raises a prob-
lem in applying Bells Local Causality condition to quantum theory. Bell and
others apparently understand (1a) to contain two expressions, each intended
to represent a single local magnitude the probability of A. Quantum theory
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does not attach a unique probability to each value of a local beable that it ac-
knowledges in a later space-time region. We saw in section 2 that it is necessary
to specify when (at what moment before 1) a theory is supposed to attach a
probability to A in (1a). We have now seen that quantum theory attaches a
probability relative to the physical situation of a hypothetical agent of limited
capacity, in need of advice before forming credences about selected magnitude
claims. An idealized representation of that agents situation in relativity is by
a segment of a time-like world-line, along which the agents situation changes
with the passage of proper time. So quantum theory attaches probabilities not
in the rst instance at moments of time, but at space-time points.
In many circumstances this will be a distinction without a di¤erence. If
p1, p2 are distinct points on  (see gure 2), one can formally distinguish the
probability attached at p1 of some local beable A in region 1 from its probability
attached at p2: but the values of these magnitudes will be equal in this scenario.
Moreover, each of these probabilities is independent of whether one considers
 part of moment t or of moment t. But the probability of A attached at p
(p") is not the same magnitude as the probability of A attached at q (q"),
and there are applications of quantum theory in which these magnitudes have
di¤erent values.
One such application is to the EPR-Bell scenario depicted in gure 3, where
a,b are now assumed to occur later than t. Consider time-like world-lines of two
hypothetical agents, Alice and Bob: Alices world line is conned to the light
cone of 1, while Bobs is conned to the light cone of 2. Suppose that physical
conditions in the overlap of their backward light cones determine that Alice and
Bob would be correct to assign a quantum state to each pair of emitted photons
as follows:
i) at every moment on Alices world-line prior to 1 the pair is assigned polariza-
tion state +, and
ii) at every moment on Bobs world-line prior to 2 the pair is assigned polariza-
tion state +.
Consider a class of pairs in which the outcome of a measurement of photon po-
larization in 2 is B (i.e. R-photon recorded as polarized parallel to the b axis).
This outcome backs the assignment at any point on Bobs world-line later than
2 but not 1 of polarization state jBi to the corresponding L-photons whose po-
larization is recorded in 2: the consequent Born probability for such a photon to
be recorded as having polarization parallel to the a-axis is therefore P jBia (A) =
jhAjBij2. This is the probability quantum theory attaches at q to that record.
By contrast, the probability P
+
a;b (A) = P
+
a (A) quantum theory attaches at
point p to that same record is given by application of the Born rule to quantum
state +, namely 12 . Only when the angle between a,b is =4 does quantum
theory attach a unique value to "the" probability at t for an L-photon in this
class to be recorded as having polarization parallel to the a-axis.
Quantum theory does attach a unique value ( 12 ) to the probability P
+
a;b (A) =
P
+
a (A) at t for an L-photon to be recorded as having polarization parallel to the
a-axis. The probability at each point of t is calculated by applying the Born rule
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to the quantum state + correctly assigned at that point. But quantum theory
also attaches a unique value at t to the conditional probability P
+
a;b (AjB) =
jhAjBij2, which equals 12 only if the angle between a,b is =4. The standard
way of understanding a conditional probability like P
+
a;b (AjB) is through the
equation
P
+
a;b (AjB) =
P
+
a;b (A;B)
P
+
a;b (B)
(5a)
often taken as a denition of conditional probability, and still well dened in
quantum theory since A,B are compatible (they are represented by commut-
ing projection operators). Here the joint probability P
+
a;b (A;B) follows from
application of a version of the Born rule generalized to apply to such a set of
compatible properties.
The function of a conditional probability magnitude like that on the left
of (5a) is to guide an agents conditional credence: her degree of belief in A,
assuming B. This contrasts with the function of the probability magnitude
P
+
a;b (A) = P
+
a (A), which is simply to guide an agents credence in A. These
are two di¤erent magnitudes, with two di¤erent functions. At t each of Alice
and Bob should have credence 12 in A, but conditional credence jhAjBij2 in A,
assuming B. Quantum theory, in this pragmatist view, denies that there is any
single probability of A at t.
Where does this leave Local Causality? Note rst that in this pragmatist
view, quantum theory acknowledges no relevant beables in region 3 of gure 3:
the state + is not a beable, and the conditions that back it are not present
in region 3. So conditionalizing on  in equations such as (1)   (4) is at best
vacuous for quantum theory.
Apparently assuming the uniqueness of each of "the probabilities attached
to values of local beables in a space-time region 1", Bells ([2004], pp. 239-
40) formulation imposes the condition that this not be altered "by specication
of values of local beables in a space-like separated region 2...". Read in this
way, quantum theory would fail to satisfy this condition if there were a unique
probability magnitude attached to each (measurable set of) values of some lo-
cal beable in 1 for which it o¤ered two distinct estimates, where the estimate
neglecting values of local beables in 2 is altered, and typically improved, by a
second estimate that species these values. But we have seen that in this view
of quantum theory it is not the function of Born probabilities to provide esti-
mates of any such unique probability magnitude, either at t or at t. So on this
reading quantum theory cannot fail to be a locally causal theory not because
it satises Local Causality but because that condition is simply inapplicable to
quantum theory. The same analysis applies to Local CausalitySU . The condi-
tions of statistical and functional redundancy both assume uniqueness of the
probability of A in region 1 presumably the probability P
+
a;b (AjB) for whose
specication b but not B proves redundant.
One may object that this conclusion rests entirely too much weight on Bells
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choice of the word alteredin his formulation of Local Causality. Indeed, he did
not use this word in his rst published formulation of a local causality condition
([2004], p.54). To some this may suggest an alternative reading of Local Causal-
ity which merely requires in this scenario that the values of P
+
a;b (AjB), P
+
a (A)
be equal even when it is allowed that these Born probabilities do not have
the function in quantum theory of providing alternative estimates for a single
magnitude the probability of A in region 1. Read in this way, Bells condition
of Local Causality is not satised by quantum theory in this pragmatist view.
But even when Bell ([2004], p.54) rst formulated a local causality condition,
he introduced it as a natural generalization of a condition of local determinism to
stochastic theories that (at each moment) uniquely specify not the subsequent
values of local beables but their probability distributions. In such a theory
P
+
a;b (AjB), P
+
a (A) must be regarded as alternative theoretical specications
of a unique probability distribution, di¤ering (if at all) only when the former
provides the better estimate since it is based on additional (surprisingly) relevant
information. That is why I do not nd this alternative reading plausible. But
in the end it is unimportant whether one understands the condition of Local
Causality to be violated by quantum theory (including relativistic quantum
eld theory) or simply inapplicable to that theory. As the next section will
show, on neither understanding does quantum theory conict with the intuitive
principle on which Bell based that condition.
4 Counterfactuals and Causation
Suppose Alice and Bob agreed that when far apart (space-like separated) each
would measure the polarization of a di¤erent photon from an entangled pair
in state + along an axis selected randomly at a for Alice, b for Bob. They
have repeated this many times on many pairs and amassed robust statistics
of their outcomes. While the statistics in the data depend counterfactually on
+, this dependence is not physical since + does not describe the condition of
the photon pair, in this pragmatist view. But other conditions in the physical
world make this the right polarization quantum state for Alice and Bob to
ascribe to their photon pairs. These conditions may be expressed by true,
signicant magnitude claims about physical systems involved in the emission
of the pairs. The statistical patterns in the data physically depend on these
backing conditions. Di¤erent conditions, backing a di¤erent polarization state
	, would almost certainly have resulted in di¤erent patterns of outcomes.
The statistics collected by Alice and Bob display striking correlations. While
Alices relative frequency of parallel and orthogonal outcomes is independent of b
and Bobs relative frequency of parallel and orthogonal outcomes is independent
of a, the relative frequency of Alices parallel and orthogonal outcomes is not
generally independent of Bobs outcome for xed b. Indeed, if one idealizes
their results, then if b = a there is a perfect correlation between Alices and
Bobs outcomes her photons polarization is recorded as parallel to this axis
if and only if his is. All these patterns of correlation are correctly predicted
13
by quantum theory. The statistical patterns in their data are just what anyone
accepting quantum theory should expect on the basis of the Born probability
distributions P
+
a;b (A;B) for state 
+ (which each of them correctly ascribed to
each pair prior to his or her measurement).
By itself this is not enough to constitute an explanation of their data, any
more than the falling barometer su¢ ces to explain the storm it gives us reason to
expect. What it leaves out is an account of what those patterns depend on. The
settings a,b depend on whatever physical processes set the orientations of the po-
larization detectors: The correlations also counterfactually depend on physical
conditions backing state +. When those conditions make + the correct state
to assign to the photon pairs, these counterfactual dependencies su¢ ce to ex-
plain the correlations at settings a,b. But for generic a,b, P
+
a;b (AjB) 6= P
+
a (A)
and P
+
a;b (BjA) 6= P
+
b (B) even when those processes and conditions are xed.
This indicates a further mutual counterfactual dependence between the physical
outcomes A,B. Arguably, Bob can explain Alices statistics by citing her out-
come A as counterfactually dependent on his outcome B, while she can explain
Bobs statistics by citing his outcome B as counterfactually dependent on her
outcome A.3 It is by appeal to such counterfactual dependencies that (actual
or merely hypothetical) physically situated agents can explain the observed sta-
tistics by applying quantum theory locally to show both that they were to be
expected and what they physically depend on.
But the patterns of correlation in Alice and Bobs data successfully predicted
by quantum theory seem to cry out for a causal explanation4 . The setting events
a,b and events in the overlap of the backward light cones of 1,2 involved in prepa-
ration of state + are naturally considered causes of these patterns, but they
leave unexplained the residual mutual counterfactual dependence of A,B. This
has convinced many that the observed correlations themselves manifest some
kind of space-like causal inuence or interaction linking space-like separated
events (as are events in regions 1 and 2). Why doesnt the explanation quan-
tum theory o¤ers simply show the world is non-local by revealing the nature
of that link? Isnt the counterfactual dependence manifested by the failure of
(Factorizability) in state + simply causal dependence?
Pa;b(A;B) = Pa(A):Pb(B) (Factorizability)
Bertrand Russell was famously skeptical about the status of causation in
fundamental physical theory, and so are many contemporary philosophers. But
there is an inuential approach to causation in science that squares nicely with
a pragmatist view of quantum theory. To introduce this approach, recall Bells
remark:
3A companion paper will o¤er such an argument as well as a possible response. I am
presently inclined to endorse the argument and to conclude that these are indeed explanations,
however shallow.
4When Bell ([2004], p.152) says "The scientic attitude is that correlations cry out for
explanation", the context makes clear that this is the kind of explanation he has in mind.
He there argues that correlations violating (Factorizability) are "locally inexplicable. They
cannot be explained without action at a distance" (p.153).
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We cannot know what would have happened if something had
been di¤erent. . . . Physical theories are more amenable in this re-
spect. We can calculate the consequences of changing free elements
in a theory, be they only initial conditions, and so explore the causal
structure of the theory. ([2004], p.101)
Bell made this remark in the course of a characteristically sensitive inves-
tigation of what it means to consider an element of a theory free. He clearly
regards initial conditions as freely speciable when building a certain kind of
theoretical model of a physical system. It may be that these initial conditions
are also subject to external control by a skilled experimenter who constructs
such a system. But even if this is not so (consider a model of galaxy forma-
tion) the theoretician may freely choose one set of initial conditions rather than
another even after deciding how to model a kind of physical system. For a sys-
tem modeled by deterministic equations, the theoretician may choose to specify
nal or intermediate rather than initial conditions. That such a choice seems
unnatural is a sign that it is made with a nod to the experimentalist or other
agent, whose choices are more limited in this respect.
Bell is particularly concerned in this article to establish the freedom of po-
larizer settings in an EPR-Bell scenario. He notes that from the theoreticians
point of view, whether such an element is considered free may depend on what
he has decided to model: an element considered free when modeling one system
will no longer count as free when that system is expanded to include these el-
ements in the model. Here an element is free if it is exogenous to the system
being modeled: Bells examples are external elds and sources. But, as he notes,
these
are invoked to represent experimental conditions. They also provide
a point of leverage for free-willed experimenters. ([2004], p.101)
Again the theoreticians freedom is inuenced if not constrained by what
kinds of interventions in the system are available to an experimenter. This
is where causal considerations become relevant to theoretical models. When
exploring the consequences of changing exogenous elements of a model the the-
oretician naturally focuses on those elements he views as potential levers for
intervention, even when no such intervention is contemplated or even physically
possible. These are the elements whose variation enables him to explore the
causal structure of the theory. At least for a deterministic model, they include
initial, but not nal, conditions.
Interventionist approaches to causation are now prominent in the medical
and social sciences, and their philosophical foundations have been extensively
explored. They are motivated not by the desire to analyze the causal relation
in counterfactual or other terms but to systematize our understanding of the
interplay between prior causal assumptions and theoretical (especially proba-
bilistic) scientic models. The causal structure of a model is to be investigated
by considering the consequences of hypothetical external interventions, them-
selves characterized in explicitly causal terms. Quantum theory supplies us with
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probabilistic models of systems that display non-localcorrelations, so we can
explore their causal structure by isolating points where intervention is possible
and seeing what would follow from such intervention.
Consider how quantum theory models a 2-photon system in state + de-
scribed in section 2 in the scenario depicted in gure 3. + is the initial (po-
larization) state of the system, and Bell may well have regarded it as a free
variable, subject to external intervention. One who denies that the quantum
state is a beable must look elsewhere for physical initial conditions to the
claims that back this state assignment. These are indeed subject to external
intervention: an experimenter could have prepared a di¤erent quantum state
	. Some such interventions would have altered the Born probabilities P
+
a (A),
P
+
b (B) of outcomes A,B in 1, 2: so some event described by a claim backing
state assignment + counts as a probabilistic common cause of those outcomes.
The polarizer settings are free variables in the model: events a, b are within
an experimenters control, which he may, for example, delegate to a quantum
random number generator. So too are the relevant aspects of the initial state
of each detector and its environment, though there will be no need to consider
interventions on these: it is necessary only to assume that they are adjusted
so as to record coincident outcomes in 1, 2 often enough to collect extensive
records to compare against predicted Born probabilities.
For each assignment of initial quantum state and choice of polarizer set-
tings, quantum theory yields a probability distribution over four ne-grained
quantum models, each of which includes a di¤erent combination of outcomes in
1, 2: these outcomes are omitted in a coarse-grainedmodel. Quantum the-
ory functions not to predict a particular combination of outcomes (as specied
in a ne-grained model) but to advise a situated agent like Alice and Bob on
what statistical distribution of these combinations to expect, given a choice of
polarizer settings and assignment of a particular initial quantum polarization
state.
This means that the actual outcomes recorded for a pair in 1, 2 are elements
in some ne-grained model and so are not exogenous to the quantum modeling
structure. They appear neither in the coarse-grained model nor in all the ne-
grained models. But the application of quantum theory here presupposes that
some outcomes are recorded, and that in each instance of coincident records the
unique actual outcome pair is represented in exactly one ne-grained model.
Since the values of the variables A, B are represented as xed elements in ne-
grained quantum models, they are not exogenous, and so they are not free
elements even in the broad sense implicit in the theoreticians use of quantum
theory. Nor are they subject to any physically possible intervention.
How could one try to make sense of an intervention on B with respect to A
or vice versa? Certainly no alternative action of Alice, Bob or other agent could
set the value of A or B without disrupting the system involved in the EPR-Bell
scenario itself (e.g. by preparing a di¤erent quantum state). In particular,
choosing to measure a di¤erent polarization component would not have this
e¤ect. Quantum theory itself provides no resources on which one can draw to
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make sense of an intervention capable of changing the outcome of Alices or
Bobs measurement of a xed component of polarization.
If it does not make sense to speak of an intervention in a system capa-
ble of making the antecedent of a counterfactual conditional true, then this is
not a causal counterfactual. Consider an ideal case in which b = a, so that
P
+
a;b (AAlicejABob) = 1. Any agent in a position to assign state + should then
endorse the counterfactuals (Same), (Same):
(Same) Had Bob recorded the opposite outcome then Alice would have also.
(Same) Had Alice recorded the opposite outcome then Bob would have also.
But the literature on causal modeling shows how important it is to distin-
guish between conditioning and intervening when assessing such counterfactuals
and the conditional probabilities on which they depend. The probability of Y
conditional on the value of X is in general di¤erent from the probability that Y
would have if an intervention had set X to that value. Only if the probability
distribution P
+
a;b (AAlicejABob) is invariant under a suitable intervention that
sets ABob would (Same) express a causal counterfactual.5 More generally, to
use the fact that P
+
a;b (AjB) 6= P
+
a (A) to argue for a causal connection be-
tween A and B, one must show that this inequality remains invariant under
suitable interventions on B. But that issue cannot even be raised unless such
an intervention makes sense.
In his sophisticated discussion of what the possibility of intervention requires,
Woodward ([2003], pp.130-3) argues that an intervention must be conceptually
possible, though it need not be physically possible. He considers a case in which
an event C that is a potential locus of intervention occurs spontaneously in the
sense that it has no causes. He argues that even in this case one can make
sense of an intervention on C. This suggests that one might make sense of
the idea that an intervention in the EPR-Bell scenario is capable of making
true the antecedent of (Same) or (Same) in the case under consideration.6 I
cannot see how to do so on the present pragmatist view of quantum theory. But
the following argument that (Same), (Same) are not causal counterfactuals
assumes only that it makes sense to intervene on B if and only if it makes sense
to intervene on A a natural assumption in the light of Lorentz invariance.
Either interventions on B, A are both (conceptually) possible or neither
intervention is possible. If neither intervention is possible, then intervention-
ist conditional probabilities such as P
+
a;b (AAlicejdo[ABob = xi]) are not well-
dened, depriving counterfactuals (Same), (Same) of a signicant causal read-
ing. In that case no-one accepting quantum theory should take either (Same) or
(Same) to establish a causal connection between Alices and Bobs outcomes.
5Pearl ([2009], p.70) would express such stability in the form P
+
a;b (AAlicejABob) =
P
+
a;b (AAlicejdo[ABob = xi]), in which do[ABob = xi] represents an intervention setting the
value of ABob to xi.
6Hausman and Woodward ([1999], [2004]) reject this suggestion, arguing that a distinction
between intervening on X with respect to Y and acting directly on both X and Y cannot be
drawn in this case. But their argument for this conclusion depends on controversial assump-
tions not shared by the present pragmatist view of quantum theory.
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Instead, suppose interventions on B, A are both (conceptually) possible.
Woodward ([2003], p.98) states necessary and su¢ cient conditions for I to be
an intervention variable for X with respect to Y . These include
I acts as a switch for all the other variables that cause X.
(I2) That is, certain values of I are such that when I attains those
values, X ceases to depend on the values of other variables
that cause X and instead depends only on the value taken by I.
Let X be a variable with values 0,1 according as Bob gets outcome AqBob,
A?Bob respectively, and Y be a variable with values 0,1 according as Alice gets
outcome AqAlice, A
?
Alice respectively for their space-like separated measurements
of polarization along axis a in state +: and assume J is some hypothetical
intervention variable for X with respect to Y here. Anyone accepting quantum
theory should believe the counterfactual conditional (Same) holds of outcomes
in the absence of interventions. It does not follow that any agent accepting
quantum theory should believe X causes Y , since neither the counterfactual
nor the conditional probability on which it depends need remain stable under
intervention on X with respect to Y , and the physical impossibility of interven-
ing on X leaves it quite unclear how to decide whether it does. Nevertheless,
assuming such stability, the (conceptual) possibility of an intervention on X
with respect to Y would establish that X is a cause of Y .
Applied to (Same), a parallel argument assuming an intervention on Y
with respect to X should convince anyone accepting quantum theory that Y
causes the corresponding value of X. However if Y is indeed a cause of X
then, since J was assumed to act as a switch, (I2) implies that X ceases to
depend on Y , so an intervention on X will not change the value of Y . But if
intervening by changing Bobs outcome does not change Alices outcome then
the counterfactual dependence (Same) does not imply a corresponding causal
dependence. The assumption that it is possible to intervene by changing Bobs
outcome implies that Alices outcome is causally independent of Bobs. But if
it is not possible so to intervene then (Same) cannot be given a causal reading.
By symmetry of reasoning, nor can (Same). Therefore the counterfactuals
(Same), (Same) are not causal.
The argument for this conclusion assumed a symmetry condition on any
(conceptually) possible interventions on outcomesA,B that comports with Lorentz
invariance if 1,2 are space-like separated. It does not exclude ABob as a cause of
AAlice, or AAlice as a cause of ABob, when these events are time-like separated.
But to establish some direct causal relation between time-like separated events
such as ABob and AAlice one would rst have to make sense of an intervention
on one with respect to the other, and then provide reasons to believe that the
conditional probability of one on the other remains invariant under such inter-
vention. I see no reason to believe that can be done. Temporal precedence of
cause to e¤ect may help us distinguish cause from e¤ect when we are dealing
with a pair of directly causally connected events. But it does not make the
earlier of two counterfactually dependent events into a cause of the later if these
are not directly causally connected.
On an interventionist approach to causation amenable to a pragmatist in-
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terpretation of quantum theory, anyone accepting quantum theory should take
some event described by claims backing the assignment of an entangled state
such as + to be a common cause of the outcome events recording the polariza-
tions of the photons concerned, whatever the space-time intervals relating these
outcome events. She should acknowledge that at least given many such com-
mon causes the actual setting of each polarizer is also a cause of the outcome
recorded by the corresponding detector. But she should reject the claim that
a local setting is a cause of a distant outcome, since in this case there is not
even any counterfactual dependence between these events. She should reject
any claim of causal dependence among the outcomes, whether these are space-
like or time-like separated. Finally, she should reject any claim of superluminal
inuence or interaction. Bells argument based on Local Causality establishes
no such thing. If you accept quantum theory you have no reason to believe that
our world is non-local in any of these senses.
5 Microcausality
After arguing that ordinary quantum mechanics fails to satisfy his condition of
Local Causality and cannot be embedded in a theory that is locally causal in this
sense, Bell ([2004], p.245) considers an alternative expression of the fundamental
causal structure of theoretical physics the requirement of "no signalling faster
than light". Already in an earlier paper he had advanced an argument that
"ordinary quantum eld theory" meets this requirement because of "the usual
local commutativity condition" (often called microcausality) that observables
localized in space-like separated regions commute. As he there noted ([2004],
p.60), that argument rested on assumptions about what we can do. It assumed
that by acting in the part of the backward light cone of 1 that does not overlap
with that of 2 an agent can control the experimental setting in 1 (and specically
the polarization axis a) but not the outcome A, while by acting in the part of
the backward light cone of 2 that does not overlap with that of 1 an agent can
control the experimental setting in 2 (and specically the polarization axis b)
but not the outcome B: and it assumed that we can change the Hamiltonian
by changing some external elds.
...if the ordinary quantum eld theory is embedded in this way in
a theory of beables, it implies that faster than light signalling is
not possible. In this human sense relativistic quantum mechanics is
locally causal. ... You may feel that only [this] humanversion [of
local causality] is sensible and may see some way to make it more
precise. ([2004], p.61)
But he found this hard to accept
For one thing, we have lost the idea that the correlations can be ex-
plained, or at least this idea awaits reformulation. More importantly
the no-signalling... notion rests on concepts which are desperately
19
vague, or vaguely applicable. The assertion that we cannot signal
faster than light immediately provokes the question: Who do we
think we are? ([2004], p.245)
So Bell draws two conclusions:
(i) Despite its connection to a no-superluminal-signalling requirement, micro-
causality is not justied as an expression or requirement of "the fundamental
causal structure of theoretical physics".
(ii)The failure of ordinary quantum mechanics to be locally causal (or even em-
beddable in a locally causal theory) leaves us with no clear idea of to how to
explain correlations violating Bell inequalities.
My response to (ii) here must be brief. Section 4 indicated how quantum
theory, in a pragmatist view, helps physically situated agents like us to explain
correlations violating Bell inequalities by showing that these were to be expected
and what they physically depend on. I submit that this does give us a clear
idea of how to explain the puzzling correlations even though the explanation
cannot be understood in terms of the operation of "near by" (spatiotemporally
contiguous) or spacelike separated causes.
In response to (i) I shall argue that:
(a) A strengthened form of microcausality can be justied as a su¢ cient condi-
tion for the consistent assignment of quantum states in Lorentz invariant ordi-
nary quantum theory:
(b) While a no-superluminal-signalling requirement does not express the funda-
mental causal structure of theoretical physics it does gure in an argument that
violation of Bell inequalities is no manifestation of superluminal causation:
(c) Theoretical physics cannot be expected to express any fundamental causal
structure, since causal structure depends on the possibility of intervention, and
(like causeand e¤ect) interventionis not a term or notion that has any place
in a precise formulation of physical theory.
To motivate (a) recall that in a pragmatist view a quantum state is assigned
at the physical situation of an actual or hypothetical agent, and that an ideal-
ized representation of such an agent is by a timelike world-line. Consider the
situation of such an agent Charlie within the overlap of the forward light-cones
of regions 1, 2 in the scenario depicted in gure 4. After recording polarization
BR for his photon, Bob should assign polarization state jBLi to Alices pho-
ton in the region of his forward light cone that does not overlap Alices. If his
recording of the linear polarization of photon R in 2 were to proceed by an ideal
projective measurement, then in that same region he should assign polarization
state jBRi to photon R, and state jBLi 
 jBRi to the pair. If Alices coincident
recording of the linear polarization AL of photon L in 2 were to proceed by an
ideal projective measurement, then in the region of her forward light cone that
does not overlap Bobs she should assign polarization state jALi to photon L,
jARi to R, and jALi 
 jARi to the pair.7
7The motivation does not presuppose that such measurements can actually be carried out.
Ideal projective measurements of spin component may prove a more practicable proposition
than those for photon polarization.
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In the overlap of the forward light cones of 1, 2 Charlie has potential access
to Alices and Bobs records. To determine the correct assignment of polariza-
tion state to the pair following Alice and Bobs ideal projective measurements,
Charlie may proceed in either of two ways. He may follow Alice in assigning
state jALi 
 jARi within the region of her forward light cone that does not
overlap Bobs and then assign state jALi 
 jBRi at his location, taking account
of the e¤ect and result of Bobs measurement in 2: or he may follow Bob in
assigning state jBLi 
 jBRi within the region of Bobs forward light cone that
does not overlap Alices and then assign state jALi
jBRi at his location, taking
account of the e¤ect and result of Alices measurement in 1. In this special case
of ideal projective measurements consistency is secured by the fact that both
procedures lead to the same state assignment within the overlap of Alices and
Bobs forward light cones.
As in this motivating example, ordinary quantum eld theory represents a
local operation in a bounded region of spacetime by an operator on a Hilbert
space associated with that region. Microcausality is usually understood as the
requirement that observables localized in space-like separated regions commute.
But, unlike observables, not all local operations are represented by self-adjoint
operators. For any local observable C in region 1 represented in ordinary quan-
tum mechanics by a self-adjoint operator on a Hilbert space with pure discrete
spectrum, its spectral projections

PCi
	
form a set of self-adjoint measurement
operators for an ideal projective measurement. So if D is also such a local ob-
servable in a space-like separated region 2 with spectral projections

PDj
	
then
a consistent assignment of state to a system following joint ideal projective mea-
surements of C and D is guaranteed if 8i; j PCi ; PDj  = 0, or, in other words, if
[C;D] = 0. So if the only local operations permitted are ideal projective mea-
surements of observables represented by self-adjoint operators on a Hilbert space
with pure discrete spectrum then the requirement that observables localized in
space-like separated regions commute su¢ ces for the consistent assignment of
quantum states in Lorentz invariant ordinary quantum eld theory. How can
such consistency be guaranteed for every type of local operation on the quantum
state of a system?
In ordinary quantum mechanics such state operations ("measurements")
may be modeled by POVMs, and the state following a POVM fEig may be
specied in terms of a set of measurement operators fMig compatible with (but
not dened by) it:
Ei =M
y
iMi where
P
i
Ei = I (6)
in which case the appropriate rule for updating a quantum state with density
operator  following a measurement with ith outcome is
  ! 0 = MiM
y
i
Tr[MiM
y
i ]
(7)
Suppose Alices measurement is represented by fMAi g, Bobs by fMBj g. Then
Charlies two state assignment procedures applied to a state  (such as j+i h+j)
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yield states
AB =
MBj M
A
i M
Ay
i M
By
j
Tr[MBj M
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i M
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i M
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j ]
(8)
BA =
MAi M
B
j M
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j M
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i
Tr[MAi M
B
j M
By
j M
Ay
i ]
(9)
Since AB = BA if

MAi ;M
B
j

= 0, a su¢ cient condition for consistent state
assignments following state operations in space-like separated regions is that the
corresponding sets of measurement operators pairwise commute. Since not all
measurement operators are self-adjoint, this represents a strengthening of the
usual microcausality condition. This strong microcausality condition is moti-
vated (though not entailed) by Lorentz invariance. If it were to fail, a consistent
quantum state assignment at a space-time region following a pair of operations
in space-like separated regions could presuppose an absolute time order of those
operations, in violation of fundamental Lorentz invariance.
I turn now to (b). Even if there were some direct causal connection between
events in space-like separated regions it would not follow that this could be used
to signal superluminally. There might be no controllable cause variable in either
region, and/or it might be that no e¤ect variable in either region is observable.
But a no-superluminal-signalling requirement may still gure importantly in an
argument that there is no direct causal connection between events in spacelike
separated regions.
On an interventionist approach, to establish a causal connection between
such regions it is necessary to demonstrate the persistence of a counterfactual
connection between values of variables (one in each region) under possible inter-
ventions. Superluminal signalling is possible only if a counterfactual connection
persists under some such physically possible intervention. So while the impos-
sibility of superluminal signalling does not exclude superluminal causation, it
does rebut the simplest and most direct argument for superluminal causation.
Bell ([2004], p.237) considers two classes of physically possible interventions
on variables, understood as local beables on apparatus settings and on values
of external elds. He appeals to Eberhards [1978] no-signalling result to ex-
clude signalling by manipulation of apparatus setting; and to microcausality,
formulated as the requirement that the commutator of Heisenberg operators
[A^(x); B^(y)] representing local observables vanish when evaluated at space-like
separated points x; y, to exclude signalling by manipulation of external elds.
The strong microcausality condition considered above, requiring commutation
of measurement operators localized in space-like separated regions, su¢ ces to
exclude superluminal signalling by a more general local state operation, however
this may be represented as a manipulation of local beables.
These considerations are not just remarks about what we can do. They cover
a wide class of physically possible interventions and show that the counterfactual
connections between values of local variables in space-like separated regions
fail to persist under these interventions. In doing so they provide defeasible
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evidence against the hypothesis that there is some direct causal connection
between events in these regions. To establish such a causal connection in the
face of this counterevidence it would be necessary to make sense of a di¤erent
kind of intervention acting on the value of a local variable in one of two space-like
separated regions that preserves its counterfactual connection with the value of
a variable in the distant region. The strong microcausality condition implies
that a counterfactual connection between distant outcomes is not preserved
under intervention on any local variable associated with a state transformation.
The possibility of a direct intervention on a local outcome was examined and
rejected in the previous section. On an interventionist approach to causation
suggested by some of Bells remarks and consonant with a pragmatist view of
quantum theory, a no-superluminal-signalling requirement is not just a remark
about what we can do. By motivating a strong microcausality condition it
helps to show that there is no reason to regard violation of Bell inequalities as
a manifestation of superluminal causation.
In his conclusion, Bell ([2004], p.245) rejected both Local Causality and no-
superluminal-signalling as possible expressions of the fundamental causal struc-
ture of contemporary theoretical physics the former because "it does not work
in quantum mechanics and this cannot be attributed to the "incompleteness"
of that theory", the latter because it is desperately vague. Does its lack of any
acceptable expression of fundamental causal structure pose a problem for con-
temporary theoretical physics? On an interventionist approach to causation it
should not.
Bell ([2004], p.215) famously argued for the exclusion of terms including
measurement,apparatus, observable, informationfrom a formulation of a
physical theory, even while acknowledging their importance in its application.
Along with cause, the term interventionbelongs on Bells list of proscribed
words. Talk of interventions is appropriate only in actual or hypothetical appli-
cations of a theory. The causal structure of any scientic theory is to be explored
by applying it to assess what would happen under various hypothetical inter-
ventions on its variables. Such interventions involve variables exogenous to the
theoretical model under study. Typically, these are not even variables of the
theory itself (consider medical interventions in which the intervention variable
corresponds to the investigators action when administering a drug or placebo).
A physical theory may be fundamental in the sense that any model permits
extension also to include variables designated as intervention variables. But
to evaluate the consequences of intervention via those variables one must hold
xed the values of certain other variables (taken to be independent causes of
Y in the notation of (I2) above). This may be inconsistent with any extension
of the original model, making the hypothetical intervention physically (though
not conceptually) impossible. Even in a physically possible intervention, the
choice as to which other variables to hold xed depends on causal considerations
external to the theory itself. So even a fundamental physical theory cannot
by itself specify the consequences of the hypothetical interventions needed to
evaluate its causal content. As Bell says, we can explore the causal structure
of a physical theory by calculating the consequences of changing free elements.
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But this requires an agents prior decision as to which elements to count as free,
and which as xed, in an application of the theory. Causal structure emerges
from fundamental physical theory only from the perspective of agents like us
applying that theory. That is why fundamental physical theory itself cannot be
expected to express or require such structure.
6 Extraordinary Quantum Mechanics
Much recent philosophical discussion of Local Causality and microcausality has
been in the context of what Ruetsche ([2011]) calls extraordinary quantum me-
chanics. The quantum mechanics of systems with an innite number of degrees
of freedom implies the existence of unitarily inequivalent representations of the
fundamental commutation relations whose rigorous treatment is the topic of
algebraic quantum eld theory. This provides an appropriate framework within
which to investigate the causal structure of relativistic quantum theory. Haags
([1992]) Local Quantum Physics is a classic presentation of the framework. It
is advertised as o¤ering a comprehensive account of local quantum physics,
understood as the synthesis of quantum theory with the principle of locality.
One naturally expects new insights about Local Causality and microcausality
to emerge from algebraic relativistic quantum eld theory. But while many fa-
cinating technical questions arise within this framework, answering them seems
unlikely to require radical revision of an analysis of the justication and impli-
cations of these principles within ordinary quantum mechanics.
In algebraic quantum eld theory a quantum state is represented by a com-
plex linear map dened on a C and/or von Neumann algebra of operators
whose value for a self-adjoint operator yields the expectation value of the corre-
sponding observable. The theory is local in that operators and states are dened
locally on open, bounded regions of space-time. A theory is dened by a net
of local algebras of bounded operators. In this framework the microcausality
condition becomes
Algebraic Microcausality [A;B] = 0 for all A 2 A(O1), B 2 A(O2)
with A;B elements of local observable algebras in spacelike sepa-
rated regions O1, O2 respectively.
Patterns of correlation in violation of Bell inequalities are known to be a
quite generic prediction of algebraic relativistic quantum eld theory, includ-
ing those among measurable values of observables localized in space-like sep-
arated regions8 . If Local Causality entailed such inequalities (in conjunction
with other incontrovertible assumptions) then this would establish the failure
of Local Causality in algebraic relativistic quantum eld theory. But section 4s
reasons for questioning the applicability of Local Causality to ordinary quan-
tum theory apply equally to algebraic relativistic quantum eld theory. If Local
8See, for example, Halvorson and Clifton [2000], reprinted in Buttereld and Halvorson
(eds.) [2004], and section 2.1 of the editorsintroduction to that volume.
24
Causality is a condition that cannot be applied to this extraordinary quantum
theory, then nor can it be said to fail in algebraic relativistic quantum eld
theory. On the other hand, if Local Causality is understood to require merely
that correlations among measurable values of observables localized in space-like
separated regions obey the Factorizability condition for every state, then it fails
in algebraic relativistic quantum eld theory just as it does in ordinary quantum
theory. But the failure of Factorizability for some states in algebraic relativistic
quantum eld theory is no more untoward than its failure in ordinary quantum
mechanics.
Adoption of the algebraic approach to relativistic quantum eld theory does
involve a minor modication in the signicance of microcausality in quantum
mechanics. In ordinary quantum mechanics, the condition that operators rep-
resenting observables localized in space-like separated points or regions com-
mute does not su¢ ce to guarantee a consistent assignment of quantum states
in the overlap of their forward light-cones. But, as noted in the last section, a
strengthened formulation (also) requiring commutation of measurement opera-
tors in such spacelike separated regions does guarantee such consistency. Even
if they are not self-adjoint, measurement operators in algebraic quantum eld
theory may still be elements of local observable algebras. Given that they are,
the condition of Algebraic Microcausality su¢ ces to guarantee consistent as-
signment of states in a Lorentz invariant algebraic quantum eld theory since it
applies to all elements of local algebras, not merely to the self-adjoint elements
representing observables.
This justication for Algebraic Microcausality claries its relation to Lorentz
invariance. A separate Covariance axiom is often thought to exhaust the content
of the requirement that an algebraic quantum eld theory be Lorentz invariant
by respecting the symmetries of a special relativistic space-time. But even a
theory conforming to a standard Covariance axiom could fail to permit state
assignments consistent with Lorentz invariance if it did not obey Algebraic Mi-
crocausality. These considerations do not show Algebraic Microcausality to be a
necessary condition for Lorentz invariance. Note that AB = BA in equations
(8),(9) also if the measurement operators anticommute:

MAi ;M
B
j
	
= 0. This
at least suggests a way of ensuring Lorentz invariant state assignments in a the-
ory violating Algebraic Microcausality. But imposing Algebraic Microcausality
certainly makes it easier to guarantee that an algebraic relativistic quantum
eld theory respect the space-time symmetries required by Lorentz invariance.
7 Conclusion
Relativistic quantum theory (in the form of ordinary or algebraic quantum eld
theory) does not satisfy Bells Local Causality condition. But this does not
mean quantum phenomena exhibit superluminal causal interactions. Applied in
a pragmatist view of quantum theory, an interventionist approach to causation
shows why they dont.
Microcausality is a relativistic requirement not because relativity forbids
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superluminal signalling but because microcausality ensures that quantum states
may be assigned in a relativistically invariant way.
Neither Local Causality nor microcausality should have been expected to
express the fundamental causal structure of theoretical physics, since causal
structure emerges only in a context of possible applications of a theoretical
model by hypothetical physically situated agents external to the model.
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